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This paper highlights the institutional features of the
inflation process and contrasts two stabilization efforts in 1964—66
and in 1986,The inflation process in Brazil is highly institutional.
It does not resemble hyperinflations where pricing and wage setting
are geared to the exchange rate by the hour, making it possible to
stop inflation by simply containing money creation and fixing the
exchange rate.
The two stabilization programs demonstrate that an incomes
policy is an essential ingredient to non—recessionary stabilization.
But they also show that demand restraint is inevitable if disinflation
is to be viable. The 1964 program was gradualist and two—handed,
relying on the supply side on wage repression. The 1986 plan was a
heterodox shock treatment centered around an uncompromising price
freeze and paying insufficient attention to the need for fiscal
restraint.
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BRAZIL'S TROPICAL PLAN1
Eliana A. Cardoso and Rudiger Dornbusch2
On February 28th 1986, with inflation at 400 percentper year, Brazil
embarked on her second major stabilization effort intwenty five years.
Figure 1 shows the history of the Brazilian inflation. In the 5years
between 1959 and 1964, increasingly populist administrations carried
inflation from 10 to 100 percent. By 1968 it was down to 20percent, a level
that persisted until the first oil shock, when inflation jumped to 40
percent. There it remained until 1979. In the 5 years between 1980 and 1985,
the government failure to absorb the debt and oil shocks ina non-
inflationary manner pushed inflation from 50 to 220 percent.3
The inflation process in Brazil is highly institutional. It does not
resemble hyperinflations where pricing and wage setting are geared to the
exchange rate by the hour, making it possible to stop inflation by simply
containing money creation and fixing the exchange rate. The design of an
appropriate stabilization mix for Brazil, therefore, needs to recognize
backward—looking indexation of wages, bonds and rents. Both the 1964 and the
current program, rather than focussing exclusively on demand—oriented
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Figure 1: Brazilian Inflation
Percent Change over the last 12 months.
Source Conjuntura Econornjca.
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policies, enlist supply side measures to avoid the recessionary consequences
typically associated with inflation fighting.
This paper highlights the institutional features of the inflation
process and contrasts the two stabilization efforts. Brazilian inflation is
best understood by recognizing the interaction of supply shocks and
indexation as the main elements in generating acceleration. The two
stabilization efforts demonstrate that an incomes policy is an essential
ingredient to non—recessionary stabilization. But they also show that demand
restraint is inevitable if disinflation is to be viable. The 1964 program
was gradualist and two-handed, relying on the supply side on wage
repression. The 1986 plan was a heterodox shock treatment centered around
an uncompromising price freeze and paying insufficient attention to the need
for fiscal restraint.
I. A Puzzle
Money expansion and velocity behavior are not enough to explain
inflation dynamics in Brazil. There is little doubt that, from the demand
side, large budget deficits in 1959—64 and in 1979—85 supported the
inflation process. But assigning them more than an accommodating role would
mean neglecting the important contribution of the supply side to inflation.
In high inflation economies, institutional arrangements provide for a
periodical resetting of real wages to a peak. The peak real wage occurs at
the date of the contract immediately after the nominal wage increase.
Subsequently, up to the next adjustment the real wage is eroded by
inflation. Figure 2 shows the actual real minimum wage in Brazil over the
past 10 years. At fixed intervals the real wage increases to a PAk and then3
is eroded over the interval between adjustments, reaching a troughjust
prior to the next adjustment, a year or six months later.
Escalation of inflation to three or four digits invariably involvesa
shortening of adjustment periods for wage and price setting. This shortening
of the adjustment interval increases inflation: in a context ofoverlapping
contracts the shortening of the intervals meanstbat a larger number of
contracts are revised on the same date, pushing up costs and hence
inflation.
In 1979, the annual adjustments of wages in Brazil were accelerated to
a twice yearly base. This translated into a supply shock for firms and led
to a doubling of the inflation process. Higher inflation in turn further
shortened intervals pushing inflation up once more. By the end of 1985,
firms and workers were begining to move into 3 months revision cycles. The
governemnt was keenly aware that the transition to even shorter periods
must have hyperintlationary consequences and hence tried to avoid the
shortening of intervals.
It is important to make a distinction between the payments period,
which is weekly or monthly, and the frequency of inflation adjustment.Wage
adjustment for past inflation occurs at fixed intervals. Inany inflation
process, intervals shrink from several years to a year, 6 month, 3 month, 1
month and ultimately to the daily course of the dollar. These periodic
adjustments are common to any inflation process and so is their gradual
shortening.The pattern of adjusting intervals is a poorly understood aspect
of the inflation process. The puzzle is why adjustment intervals showso
much inertia.1976.5 —
1986.6
Figure 2: Minimum Real Wage
Monthly data.
Source: Conjuntura Economica.4
The average real wage during the contract will depend on the rate of
inflation and the length of the interval. Given the expected inflation rate,
the same average real wage can be obtained by the combination of shorter
intervals and lower real peaks or larger intervals and bigger peaks. If wage
earners are unable to lend and borrow in perfect capital markets, they are
forced to hold cash in order to sustain their consumption levels during the
period when their real wages are below the real average. Cash held for later
consumption has its purchasing power eroded by ongoing inflation. Wage
earners who do not have access to perfect credit markets clearly should
prefer an even flow of real wages rather than the tooth—saw pattern of
Figure 2. They must be willing to trade smaller nominal wage increases for
shorter periods of wage resetting.
In Brazil, adjustments intervals have shrunk from 30 months in the
1950s to 6 and 3 months in the 1980s. The costs associated with lagged
inflation adjustments can be indicated by the number of months for which the
real wage was below the real average during one interval multiplied by the
ratio average/trough wage in the same interval. Figure 3 shows how higher
costs associated with lagged inflation adjustments are related with higher
real wages for the 37 adjustment periods of the minimum wage that occurred
between 1954 and 1986 in Brazil. We do not understand however why intervals
do not melt much more rapidly when inflation accelerates, in such a way that
costs for wage earners associated with lagged adjustments would be smaller
and roughly constant.
The costs of more frequent inflation adjustment of wages for firms are
negligible. Adjustments of the pay period use resources, but not the









Figure 3: Average Real Wage and Cost ofLagged
Wage Adjustment










willing to pay even wages equal in average to the discounted value of the
tooth—saw pattern. Yet we only observe a shrinking of intervals when the
inflationary erosion becomes extreme. Moreover, the transition often takes
the form of an "advance" on the upcoming adjustment.
II. Other Institutional Aspects of Inflation
Fischer (1977) and Taylor (1979) have drawn attention to the
persistence of price disturbances in a setting of overlapping longterm wage
contracts even under forward looking, rational expectations behavior and a
well—understood program of monetary control. In the Brazilian setting,
institutional factors take, to a large extent, the room of relative wage and
expectations mechanisms that characterize Fischer—Taylor contracts.
Mandatory indexation is backward—looking and periodically readjusts wages
and other contracts.
We express this inflation process in Eq.(1). Wage inflation, wt, is
shown equal to past price inflation plus a disturbance term. Ceteris
paribus, current inflation, pt, is equal to past inflation, via indention
of wages, the exchange rate and public sector prices. The output gap or
unmeployment affects current inflation because it influences the marginal
costs of firms to the extent that turnover of the labor force can be used
for wage cutting. The third term, in, represents supply shocks. These are
superimposed on indexation which propagates them.
(1) Ptwt +agapt +ut wt =pt-i +vt6
This inflation process has several implications. First, current supply
shocks are automatically transmitted to future periods. An oil price
increase, a real depreciation, increases in indirect taxes, elimination of
public sector subsidies or increases in the real price of agricultural goods
raise the current rate of inflation and are transmitted via indexation into
increased inflation in subsequent periods. In fact, to raise real pricesor
cut real wages in the presence of full indexation, the frequency of
adjustment of exchange rates and public sector prices has to be higher than
the frequency of wage adjustments. Only then is it possible to beat the
indexation, cutting the average real wage during the adjustment period by
stepping up the rate of inflation. Indexation of the financial system, of
the tax structure and of the public debt imply that changes in the inflation
rate are automatically and fully accomaodated.
Second, a slowdown in the growth rate of nominal spending cannot
eliminate inflation from one day to the next. They run counter to the cost—
inflation that comes from lagged inflation captured by the wage inflation
tern in (1) .Theneo—classical answer of instant recontracting of the labor
force with reduced wage adjustments in the face of a shift to a non-
inflationary monetary regime is implausible. The presence of inertia is thus
one good reason for the use of incomes policy in a stabilization program.
Third, the inertia of the inflation process implies that contracts that
are not explicitly indexed in a backward looking way, as for example
shortterm loans in the financial system, carry forward looking inflation
adjustments. At any point in time there is a given stock of such contracts
outstanding. Their maturity may run as far as 6 months or a year. A sudden
disinflation would imply an arbitrary redistribution between debtors and
creditors.7
Fourth, any escalation of inflation started off by some supply shock
encounters further endogeneous elements that feed the inflation process. One
is the increase in the velocity of money. Another one is the inflationary
erosion of tax revenue which then implies increased rates of monetary
expansion.
Finally, an important factor in accelerating inflation is the
endogenous shortening of the interval for inflation adjustment of wages,
public sector prices and the exchange rate.
III.Two Stabilizations
The main reason for the sharp increase in inflation between 1959 and
1962 was the fast increase in demand. Between 1957 and 1962, industrial
output grew at 11 percent per year. The share of the Central Government
budget deficit in output increased from 2.8 percent in 1960 to 4.3 percent
in 1963, while the seignorage share in GD? widened from 3.6 percent in 1959
to 5.7 percent in 1962. The combination of a 30 percent deterioration of the
terms of trade, the lack of external finance, a bad coffee crop in 1963 and
adverse climatic conditions leading to an agriculture disaster in 1964 all
contributed to the inflation problem.
The 1964—68 Stabilization: The economic crisis was the vehicle for a
military take—over on March 1964. The ?rograma de Acao Econômica do Governo
(PAEG,l964/66) detailed a plan to reduce inflation gradually in 3 years
using fiscal consolidation and incomes policy. The following were the main
aspects of the prograni:
(a) Fiscal consolidation led to a gradual reduction in the deficit from
4.2 percent of GD? in 1963 to only 1 percent in 1966. The main instruments8
of this budget balancing were increases in public sector prices, cuts in
subsidies, increased tax collections obtained through an increase in
indirect taxes and better administration to avoid tax evasion.Despite the
initial increase in wages for the military and civilservants, and an
increase in investment expenditures after 1965, the deficitwas reduced.
Later on, the reduction of real wages also helped the budget.
(b) The exchange rate was devalued by 70 percent at the outset of the
program.
Cc) Starting in 1965, the incomes policy took the form of grantingwage
increases not in line with past inflation, but rather geared to"expected
inflation" which was announced to be declining.In terms of the inflation
model of Eq. (1) the disinflation was achieved by breaking the link between
current and past inflation wage adjustments became forward—looking and
limited to an officially imposed inflation forecast. The cut inwage
inflation helped absorb the impact of public sector price increases and
exchange depreciation. But the reduction in price inflation fell by a wide
margin short of the anticipated decline built into wage agreements. The
effect was to reduce real wages. The real minimumwage fell by 15 percent
between 1964 and 1967. The wage cut made room both for budgetbalancing and
for an improved external competitiveness while at the same timebankrolling
a cut in the rate of inflation.
Cd) On the price side, the government introduced aprogram of fiscal,
credit and other incentives to firms which would accept a convenant not to
raise prices by more than a stated percentage. Allowable cost increases
excluded wage awards in excess of those contemplated in the governmentwage
formula. In 1966, firms were promised a 20 percent reduction in excisetaxes9
if they carried out wage increases in accordance with thegovernment wage
formula. From 1967 on, price guidelines became more pervasive, fallingon
most large industrial firms.
(e) Monetary policy was erratic. An initial moderate expansion in 1964
was followed by a tightening in 1965—66. Indexation in financial markets was
used to mobilize domestic saving and to create a market for public sector
debt. The black market premium that had reached 60 percent in the last
quarter of 1963, by the end of 1964 was already down to 4 percent and
oscillated below 1 percent in 1965 and 1966.
The program was successful in reducing inflation without generatinga
dramatic decline in economic activity. Inflation declined from 144 percent
in the first quarter of 1964 to 57 percent in 1965 and 38 percent in 1966.
Industrial production declined in the first year of stabilization by 5
percent, but then showed a rapid recovery. By 1966 it was already 6 percent
above the pre—crisis level.
In 1968 a new plan was adopted. First, a crawling peg exchange rate
policy was introduced to depart from the pattern of real exchange rate
swings associated with discontinuous devaluations. Second, credit became
more abundant. Third, in response to public reaction against the squeeze the
government revised the wage adjustment rule. The new wage formula corrected
half—way the inflation underestimation. Real minimum wages continued to fall
until 1970 and a new formula was created in 1974. Wage readjustment then
returned to the pattern of backward lookingcatch—up indexation.
The 1965—68 reforms were the basis for an extended period of strong
growth with stable inflation. Between 1968 and 1974 real growth averaged 10
percent per year and inflation declined to only 20 percent.10
The 1986 Stabilization: The current stabilization set an end toan
inflation that reached 400 percent per year in the first month of 1986.The
inflation escalation that started with the second oil shock andthe
shortening of the intervals for wage setting accelerated with thelarge real
depreciation in 1983, with an agricultural disaster, with correctionof
prices of the public sector and subsidies cuts. A major recession in 1983
cut the real wage, which neverthless started torecover in 1984. In 1985.
the new democratic government embarked on aprogram of expansion that
carried real growth to 8 percent (see Table 1).Anotherbad crop introduced
supply shocks which, combined with the recovery, led to a shortening of the
interval for inflation adjustment in some sectors of theprivate sector to
only 3 months. Mindful of inflation acceleration and upcoming elections
later in the year, the government embarked on aprogram of stabilization via
incomes policy.
Table 1: Brazilian Macroeconomic Data, 1982—86
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986a
Inflationb 98 142 197 227 60
Growth 0.9 —3.2 4.5 8.3 7.0
Budget Deficitc 16.7 19.9 22.2 27.1 9.9
Operational Deficitc 6.5 3.0 1.6 3.5 4.1
Current Account Deficite 8.5 3.5 0 0.1 0.5
Interest Paymentsc 6.5 5.3 5.4 4.7 3.7
aEstimate; bDec._Dec of GDP
Source: Banco Central do BrasH11
Plans for an inflation stabilization that circumvented the critical
difficulty of inertia had been widely discussed in Brazil for more than a
year and the Argentine and Israeli precedents were already on hand. The key
steps of the Cruzado Plan were the following:
(a) Wages were readjusted and frozen. Contracts with several months to
readjustment were rolled up and contracts that had experienced a recent
readjustment were rolled back. As a sweetener, the minimum wage received a
bonus of 15 percent increase over its past teal average and other workers
an 8 percent bonus.
(b) All prices and the exchange rate were frozen until further notice.
(c) A tablita was devised to eliminate the expected inflation built
into extant contracts and thus avoid arbitrary redistribution between
debtors and creditors. A new currency, the cruzado, was introduced to help
facilitate the readjustment.
(d) Indexation which had been blamed for the acceleration of inflation
was eliminated. For wages a escala movel with a 20 percent threshold was
substituted. In financial markets indexation was maintained only for
instruments of more than one year maturity.
(e) There was a sharp initial monetisation of the economy to avoid the
Argentine problem of exceptionally high real interest rates. In the first
three months following stabilization the monetary base doubled.
(f) On the fiscal side the tax reform of December 1985 was expected to
have laid much of the groundwork for stabilization. The expected revenue
gains were to close a budget deficit of 6 percent of GDP. Tax revenues rose
disappointingly little due to two features of the approved tax bill: a
lowered income—tax withholding schedule and an increased reliance on12
taxation of financial assets no longer popular. Revenues of state—owned
companies were hurt by the price freeze, spending ran higher than
anticipated and subsidies that were cut during 1983—84 have since staged
back. The public sector wage bill increased in line with theeconomy—wide
trend.
(g) External factors favored the program in three respects. The decline
in world interest rates reduced the debt sevice burdens in thebudget and in
the external balance. Sharply lower world oil prices madea major
contribution in the same direction. Dollar depreciation in the early period
of the program helped achieve a gain in competitiveness. Thus theprogram
started oft with a more than favorable development on the external balance
side.
In terms of Eq. (1) the key point of the program was to eliminate catch-
up inflation in the wage. This was done by the offsetting influences of
rolling some contracts back and others up. Thus inertial inflation was
simply suspended. But this time the real wage was increased. The cost was
borne by a reduction in profit margins of price—controlled firms.
Between February and June, cumulative inflation was zero. Industrial
production increased by 12 percent in the first half year of the program
relative to the same period a year before.
Over the past 8 months the program has taken a life of its own. Fuelled
by strong popular suppport for the price freeze Finance Minister Dilson
Funaro elevated controls to a fetish. The budget was allowed to deteriorate
dramatically, the trade surplus disappeared, shortages and black markets
became pervasive. But "zero inflation" remained the ministerial obsession.13
Minor adjustments in the program werenecessary already in September.
They went in the direction of very special excise taxes:so large that they
were claimed to solve the budget problem, and so small thatthey could be
eliminated from the official price index. Followinga landslide election
victory, a second round of such excise tax increaseswas imposed in November
with the objective of raising 4 percent of GD? inrevenue. Once again they
were eliminated from the index. Clearly the government wastrying to reenact
the 1964 program of real wage cuts to restore the externalbalance and the
budget. But the absence of any austerity and the restraints ofa democratic
regime put severe limits on the exercice.
By October, inflationary expectations were becoming extreme. The
removal of long adjustment lags in wages, whichpreviously had been an
element of short—term stabilization, meant that inflationcould accelerate
dramatically. This possibility is reinforced by the escala movel which
potentially put wage adjustments into the express lane.
Comparison: During the 1964 stabilization the preceding high inflation
with no indexation had reduced the real value of thepublic debt to less
than 4 percent of GD?. In the 1986 stabilization,by contrast, prevailing
indexation and high real interest rates had lefta debt—income ratio of
foreign and domestic debt combined of 50 percent as amortgage for
stabilization. The large debt and insufficient budgetimprovement led to
the expectation that the government might seek toreduce the debt burden by
inflation soon pushed up nominal interest rates and theblack market
premium.14
By the end of the year the freeze remained on. but the heat was on,
too. The black market for dollars stood at a premium of more than 100
percent and even with official price stability the shortterni interest rate
reached 150 percent. A dramatically clever program appeared to have been
thrown into the wind.
IV.Issues and Lessons
The two Brazilian stabilization programs seen in conjunction teach a
number of lessons. First, incomes policy is a valuable means in achieving
disinflation. It helps avoid dramatic unemployment. But incomes policy by
itself is not enough. Without fiscal consolidation the disinflation is not
viable, with a boom it does not even last long. Moreover, disinflation has
not been costless. In 1964 wage repression was the front payment for
disinflation and in 1986 it was the redistribution from firms to workers
implicit in the rise in real wages and the cut in profit margins, a loss in
exchange reserves and a dererioration in competitiveness.
The second lesson concerns indexation. Indexation in the presence of
supply shocks is a source of inflation propagation. But it also protects an
inflation rate against rapid acceleration. An economy with long adjustment
periods has an inflation process that is not rapidly expected to accelerate.
Indexation of assets reinforces the element of stability. In the 1964
episode indention was reinforced and broadened. In 1986, by contrast it was
eliminated altogether and replaced by adjustment triggers without cap. The
latter setting has led to a highly volatile atmosphere where inflationary
expectations can easily become the driving mechanism for an actual inflation








































































































































































































































































































































and to the black market. Inflation now, contrary to thepast twenty years,
can quite possibly become self—generating. Figure 4 shows monthly inflation
between January 1984 and December 1986. The sharp decelerationof inflation
in mid 1986 was substituted by an explosion of prices in December.The
lesson is that restoration of indexation in labor and assetmarkets, with
long adjustment intervals, is good advice.
A third point concerns monetisation following disinflation.During
the high inflation real money demand declines. When pricestability breaks
out the demand for real balances rises. The real interest rates turns
sharply positive unless the government engages in a significant
monetisation. But it is difficult to know what is enough. One criterion is
the level of the real interest rate, the other the behavior ofmonetary
aggregates. It is hard to judge the appropriate level of real balances
because in the inflation period financial liberalisation will have taken
place which at least partially destroys traditional linkages between
interest rates and real balances. It is difficult to judge whether
hysteresis is important here. But being too conservative is problematic
because high real interest rates in the presence of a large public debt
create a fiscal problem.
A final point concerns the budget. Must the budget be strictlyzero,
or even in surplus for monetary reform to succeed? Or is it possible to
finance a small deficit in a noninflationary manner? Toa large extent this
depends on the growth rate of output, the prospective path of real tax
revenues and the real rate of interest. If output growth is high and the
real rate of interest is negligible, there is room for deficits. If the
relation is the reverse substantial caution is needed because of the riskof16
building up a fiscal problem which ultimately requires inflationary
liquidation.
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